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Endogenous modulation 
a b s t r a c t 
Computational models of pain consider how the brain processes nociceptive information and allow mapping 
neural circuits and networks to cognition and behaviour. To date, they have generally have assumed two largely 
independent processes: perceptual inference, typically modelled as an approximate Bayesian process, and action 
control, typically modelled as a reinforcement learning process. However, inference and control are intertwined 
in complex ways, challenging the clarity of this distinction. Here, we consider how they may comprise a parallel 
hierarchical architecture that combines inference, information-seeking, and adaptive value-based control. This 
sheds light on the complex neural architecture of the pain system, and takes us closer to understanding from 


















































One of the most fundamental questions in pain neuroscience is iden-
ifying what brain activity is necessary and sufficient for the conscious
xperience of pain. A common conceptual approach is to try and decon-
truct different components of pain behaviour and experience, and then
e-piece them together to understand how pain emerges from their coor-
inated operation ( Melzack, 1968 ). But this leads to the problem of iden-
ifying precisely what these individual components should be, and then
nderstanding how they functionally fit together. In contrast, computa-
ional approaches define the specific computations that different neural
opulations implement, and then determine how they are integrated to
enerate pain experience and behaviour. Mathematical accounts have
ocused on two central processes: perceptual inference (i.e. identifying
he sensory features and causes of a pain state) and action control (i.e.
voking responses or actions appropriate to the event). Corresponding
odels, in particular Bayesian inference and reinforcement learning re-
pectively, have had some success in explaining behaviour and corre-
ponding neural activity across a range of appropriately-designed ex-
erimental paradigms ( Seymour and Dolan, 2013 ; Büchel et al., 2014 ;
iech, 2016 ). But this leads to the question of how they interact, and to
hat extent they are really independent processes, especially as the sub-
ective experience of pain seems to seamlessly integrate both perceptual
nd motivational features. ∗ Corresponding author. 
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053-8119/© 2020 Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under thIn this review, we first outline the conceptual basis for computational
odels of pain. We review theories of perceptual inference (Bayesian
nd predictive coding models) and action control (reinforcement learn-
ng). We then discuss how these two processes interact , and what this
eans for our understanding of pain perception and behaviour. 
. The computational approach to pain 
Computational models aim to provide a mechanistic understanding
f how activity in the brain yields behaviour. Ultimately, this views
rain activity in terms of information processing: what quantities are
epresented by the brain, and how the brain computes information to
enerate behaviour in the organism. Marr provided a general frame-
ork for such a computational approach ( Marr et al., 1979 ), outlining 3
asic levels of understanding that have been enormously influential in
euroscience. Marr’s three levels of understanding brain systems com-
rise: (1) a computational level - understanding formally what problems
he system is trying to solve; (2) an algorithmic level - what solutions
he system adopts at a mathematical level; and (3) an implementational
evel - how these mathematical operations are achieved by biological
nd neuronal ‘hardware’. Any complete understanding of the pain sys-
em should span all 3 levels ( Fig. 1 ). 
Marr’s conceptualisation of different levels illustrates that there are
wo different ways in which computational models can be applied
o a biological system such as pain ( Dayan and L.F. Abbott, 2001 ;
aplan, 2011 ). At the computational level, for instance, one can pro-cam.ac.uk (F. Mancini). 
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Fig. 1. Computational neuroscience and Marr’s 3 levels. Mar proposed a foundational approach for understanding neural systems based on computational, algorithmic 
and implementational levels. In the example on the right, for simple pain conditioning, the overall computational goal is defined as the minimisation of pain. 
Although there are several algorithms which can achieve this, a biological plausible one comes from reinforcement learning (temporal difference learning), and 
involves error-based learning an aversive value metric for discrete states. Neurophysiolgical evidence shows that PAG neurons actually encode a corresponding error 

























































































f  ose models that achieve the overall aim of the system and replicate
bservable behaviour, but don’t necessarily describe the underlying al-
orithmic process itself: in this sense, these can be thought of as de-
criptive models, because they capture the problem the brain is trying
o solve. However, one can also propose models that aim to emulate
oth observable behaviour and the actual computations that the brain
irectly and physically implements: these can be thought of as mecha-
istic models, because they solve the problem in the same way that the
rain does. Clearly, the goal of computational neuroscience is to deter-
ine the most accurate mechanistic models, because this can lead to an
nderstanding of how the brain implements computations in terms of
hysiological processes at the level of molecules, neurons and circuits.
n this way, the model provides a fundamental level of understanding
hat describes the operation of the system, that transcends mere descrip-
ions of physiological interactions at various neuroanatomical scales. 
. Sensory processing of pain as statistical inference 
The idea that sensory processing of pain signals in the brain might
omprise some sort of statistical inference about the cause of incom-
ng nociceptive information is a longstanding idea, following parallels
ith other sensory domains such as vision and audition ( Wager, 2005 ;
atson et al., 2006 ; Brown et al., 2008 , 2008 ; Seymour and Dolan, 2013 ;
oshida et al., 2013 ; Moutoussis, Fearon, et al., 2014 ; Anchisi et al.,
015 ; Wiech, 2016 ; Tabor et al., 2017 ; Ongaro et al., 2019 ; Hoskin
t al., 2019). Inference models, especially Bayesian models, have be-
ome popular in the context of the broader ’Bayesian brain hypothesis’,
nd reflect the fact that sensory percepts are typically biased by sources
f predictive information in an approximately Bayesian optimal way,
uch that the resulting percept reflects the integration of this informa-
ion ( Knill et al., 2004 ; Friston, 2012 ). This information can come from
redictions generated by preceding (prior) information or cues (e.g. the
ight of a dentist drill going into your mouth), or multisensory integra-
ion (e.g. seeing blood coming from a fresh wound). 
In the case of pain, the argument in favour of statistical inference
odels has primarily come from the observation that pain intensity
udgements are biased in the direction of expectations, which is a defin-
ng feature of placebo and nocebo effects ( Atlas, Bolger, et al., 2010 ;
olloca et al., 2006 ; Brown et al., 2008 ; Wiech, Vandekerckhove, et al.,
014 ). From a Bayesian perspective, inference involves integrating an
xpected distribution of intensity (the ’prior’) with noisy incoming sen-
ory information (the ’likelihood’) in a statistically optimal way, and
his yields the inferred probability distribution of the actual intensity
the ’posterior’). Ultimately, experienced pain should reflect some func-
ion of the statistics of this posterior distribution ( Tabor et al., 2017 ). Evidence for Bayesian inference in pain processing was first formally
nvestigated by Yoshida et al. (2013) , who looked at the influence of un-
ertainty of the prior distribution of intensity on phasic thermal pain.
lthough this clearly supported the notion that pain involves some sort
f inference, this and subsequent studies also indicated that the nature of
his inference may be quite complex. For instance, uncertainty appears
o enhance pain per se , over and above its role in inference, suggesting
hat the brain adds a ’cost’ to uncertainty as a post-processing step to
nference ( Yoshida et al., 2013 ; Anchisi et al., 2015 ). Furthermore, the
rior precision can be resistant to updating, in the case where explicit in-
orrect predictions are continually refuted by experience ( Jepma, 2018 ).
urther still, rather than a smooth integration of priors and likelihoods,
riors can be immediately down-weighted if there is a large discrepancy
ith the sensory evidence, suggesting a thresholding process that detects
udden changes in the enviornment (unexpected uncertainty ( Yu and
ayan, 2005 )), to re-evaluate the world if ones internal model is wrong
 Hird et al., 2018 ). Together, these issues illustrate the problem if know
hat exactly the brain is optimising, with what cost function, and based
n what information ( Wald, 1947 ). 
Previous studies have focused on uncertainty in the prior distribu-
ion, but the importance of uncertainty in the likelihood (i.e. the nois-
ness of the nociceptive input) has not been well studied because it is
ifficult to manipulate experimentally (unlike Gabor gratings in vision,
or example). Furthermore, other aspects of pain have not been formally
nvestigated, notably modulation by multisensory or motor efference in-
ormation. In the case of multisensory modulation, phenomena includ-
ng touch-induced analgesia ( Mancini, Beaumont, et al., 2015 ), modula-
ion by colour information ( Moseley et al., 2007 ) and the painful rubber
and illusion ( Ehrsson et al., 2007 ) illustrate how pain is modulated by
ther sensory modalities, but there have been no systematic computa-
ionally motivated studies investigating the influence of concomitant
ensory stimuli - something that is likely to be important in naturally
ccurring nociceptive stimuli ( Haggard et al., 2013 ). Similarly, the role
f motor efference information is likely to be important: for instance,
elf-induced stimulation reduces perceived pain, but it is unclear if this
elates to timing uncertainty or cognitive controllability and self-efficacy
 Braid et al., 2006 ; Litt, 1988 ; Mohr et al., 2005 ; Helmchen et al., 2006 ;
iech, Kalisch, et al., 2006 ; Salomons et al., 2007 ; Bräscher et al., 2016 ;
orhani et al., 2017 ). 
These issues raise a deeper question as to exactly what is being in-
erred during pain perception. Classical sensory inference tasks are exte-
oceptive, in which the goal of perception is the identity or an observable
nd thus externally verifiable property of an external object. In the case
f nociception, it makes sense for nociceptive input to be used, at least
n part in an exteroceptive manner, because this can resolve external in-
ormation that may have a causal influence on future events (e.g. iden-
































































































































ifying an object on the basis that it caused pain, such as distinguishing
 paper clip from a drawing pin by touch) ( Price et al., 2003 ). However,
ain also embodies an intercoceptive sense concerning inference about
nternal bodily states: these are intrinsically linked to innate motiva-
ional drives supporting homoeostasis ( Craig, 2009 ; Farkas, 2013 ), and
ot externally observable or verifiable by others. Importantly, the pain
ystem has distinct afferent nociceptive pathways from deep and super-
cial laminae of the dorsal horn of the spinal cord which may relate to
issociable exteroceptive and interoceptive sensing (sending projections
o lateral and medial thalamic nuclei, respectively) ( Dostrovsky et al.,
013 ). Although it remains unclear how these parallel pathways con-
ribute to the overall subjective perception of pain, this suggests that
here may be distinct inference processes underlying interoceptive and
xteroceptive pathways. 
.1. Predictive coding 
Bayesian models are typically applied to perception at a descrip-
ive level. Whereas perception may be approximately Bayes optimal in
ome cases, it doesn’t necessarily mean that the brain is implementing
ayesian inference directly ( Colombo et al., 2012 ). One reason for ques-
ioning the plausibility of Bayesian models at an algorithmic level is that
epresenting full probability distributions across a neural population is
nrealistic unless the distribution is simple, which is rarely likely to be
he case. This has led to algorithmic approaches to perceptual inference
hat approximate inference, such as Predictive Coding ( Rao et al., 1999 ;
riston, 2005 ; Aitchison et al., 2017 ). In predictive coding models, infer-
nce occurs on a hierarchy in which higher level features are inferred on
he basis of lower level features. A particular level encodes a prior expec-
ation of what its input will be, and sends this information to the level
elow. This lower level compares this prediction with the observed fea-
ures and computes a prediction error; the prediction error is sent back
o the higher level and can be used to update the prior expectations to
inimise surprise ( Fig 2 ). The amount of belief updating is determined
y the relative precision of prior and incoming information, allowing
nformation to be weighted by its uncertainty ( Fig 2 ) ( Friston, 2008 ).
or completeness, it is worth noting that there are notions of predictive
oding that are not fully internalistic , incorporating enactive, embod-
ed and extended cognition ( Allen et al., 2018 ; Ramstead et al., 2019 ;
ruineberg et al., 2018 ). 
In the case of pain, predictive coding may offer an account of the na-
ure of both exteroceptive and interoceptive pain processing in different
ortical hierarchies ( Büchel et al., 2014 ; Fardo et al., 2017 ; Owens et al.,
018 ; Seth, 2013 ; Allen et al., 2018 ). In the context of interoceptive
rocessing, it is known that posterior, granular regions of insula cor-
ex receive afferent input arising from superficial laminae of the dorsal
orn, projecting via medial thalamic nuclei (including VMPo) to the
nsula, where other visceral and interoceptive afferents also converge
 Craig, 2002 ; Evrard, 2019 ). Within the insula, there appears to be a hi-
rarchical remapping along a posterior to anterior gradient, with more
omplex, high-level representations in the anterior insula ( Evrard et al.,
014 ), and this could plausibly serve as a substrate for an interoceptive
redictive coding hierarchy. Neuroimaging studies provide provisional
upport for this hypothesis: for instance, one would predict that neural
ctivity in layers of the hierarchy that primarily code prediction errors,
s opposed to features themselves, would evoke less activity for expected
han unexpected pain ( Geuter, 2017 ). 
It has also been suggested that the predictive coding hierarchy may
xtend to the brainstem and even the spinal dorsal horn, with potential
nsight into the nature of ascending and descending architecture of pain
athways ( Büchel et al., 2014 ). Some evidence for this comes from evi-
ence of precision coding (i.e. uncertainty) in the periaquenductal grey
PAG) during inference tasks ( Grahl et al., 2018 ). The PAG is a critical
ub for pain processing, receiving major descending projections from
ub-regions of the insula cortex, as well as ascending input from the
orsal horn, to which it also reciprocally projects via the rostroventraledulla ( Basbaum et al., 1984 ; Heinricher et al., 2009 ; Evrard et al.,
012 ). 
In the context of exteroceptive processing, it is known that the pri-
ary somatosensory cortex (S1) and secondary somatosensory cortex
S2) receive projections that arise from lamina I and deeper layers of
he dorsal horn via more lateral thalamic nuclei, where they converge
ith other exteroceptive somatosensory input ( Apkarian et al., 1989 ;
ostrovsky et al., 2013 ; Stevens et al., 1993 ). These cortical projec-
ions are topographically organised ( Mancini, Haggard, et al., 2012 ),
resumably supporting fine spatial encoding and discrimination of no-
iceptive inputs ( Mancini, Bauleo, et al., 2014 ). S1 and S2 are mutually
nterconnected ( Pandya et al., 1969 ); they both send and receive pro-
ections to/from subregions of the posterior parietal cortex, including
he superior parietal lobule (areas 5 and 7), the inferior parietal cor-
ex, the insula, and the motor and premotor cortex ( Darian-Smith et al.,
993 ; Flaherty et al., 1991 ; Pons et al., 1986 ). The primate S1 also sends
omatotopically-arranged projections onto the putamen ( Flaherty et al.,
991 , 1995 ; Robbe, 2018 ). Very few studies have investigated whether
his neural pathway supports predictive coding of pain signals and
he little evidence available is controversial. In support of the predic-
ive coding view, it has recently been shown using MEG that spatial
ain processing within this hierarchy is modulated by expectations and
heir violations in a manner consistent with a predictive coding model
 Fardo et al., 2017 ). However, a recent fMRI study suggests that neural
ctivity in S1 and S2 primarily relate to sensory encoding rather than
redictive coding of nociceptive signals ( Geuter, 2017 ), although it did
eport evidence of predictive coding in the anterior insula. 
In summary, the notion that pain involves a sensory processing
tream that performs some sort of statistical inference has preliminary
upport but needs further research. It is plausible that statistical in-
erence occurs in pathways that are at least partly parallel and partly
istinct along spino-thalamo-cortical hierarchies for interoceptive and
xteroceptive processing. At the same time, the cortical neuroanatomy
s clearly more complex than can be fully explained by current com-
utational models ( Vierck, 2013 ). Furthermore, it is also clear that the
ubjective experience of pain cannot be solely explained by statistical in-
erence of sensory signals, which is further evident in experiments that
robe the motivational basis of pain. 
. Motivational processing of pain as optimal control 
Pain invariably leads to some sort of action, ranging from sim-
le motor reflexes and physiological responses, to conscious ’deliber-
tive’ decisions. Such actions should be appropriate to the pain experi-
nced, either preparing for, reducing, or completely avoiding it if pos-
ible ( Fields, 2018 ). Optimal actions are usually dependant on learn-
ng, which has been well studied in terms of Pavlovian (Classical) and
nstrumental (Operant) learning ( Mackintosh, 1983 ). This has uncov-
red much about the structure of motivation and learning systems across
pecies, exposing how observed behaviour derives from multiple under-
ying interacting control processes. 
First, pain induces a set of innate, evolutionarily ’hard-wired’ re-
ponses: some of these are specific to pain (e.g. limb withdrawal), some
eneralise to aversive stimuli of any cause (e.g. withdrawal, autonomic
rousal), and many are remarkably sophisticated, context-sensitive be-
avioural repertoires ( Bolles, 1971 ). 
Second, this innate response set can be hijacked through Pavlovian
ssociative learning, such that a cue that reliably predicts pain will
licit a response similar to the innate response on presentation of the
ain itself. This is not implemented by a single learning system, but by
ultiple, partially independent learning processes (e.g. cerebellar learn-
ng of precisely timed motor limb withdrawal or eye-blink responses
 Zhang et al., 2016 ; Ernst et al., 2019 ), and amygdalar learning of au-
onomic responses, freezing and other generalised aversive responses
 Herry et al., 2014 ; Janak et al., 2015 )). 
B. Seymour and F. Mancini NeuroImage 222 (2020) 117212 
Fig. 2. Simplified model of predictive coding and reinforcement learning. On the left, the predictive coding model sees predictions (the prior) transmitted to the 
level below, in anticipation of an incoming signal. This is compared to the signal (the likelihood) and prediction error computed and sent back to the level above to 
modify the expectation (though learning). The learning process may be modified by a precision signal (not shown) in keeping with a (Bayesian) predictive coding 
model ( Friston, 2008 ; Aitchison et al., 2017 ). On the right, the reinforcement learning (RL) model considers three classes of action at different levels. On the bottom, 
incoming nociceptive signals reflexively lead straight to an innate response (although they do not require it, they may be modulated from ’higher-order’ control 
centers). The intermediate ’model-free’ level involves value learning of states and actions, where the values simply represent the overall goodness or badness of a 
state or action. As in predictive coding, these are learned using a prediction error, and well described by simple RL models such as Temporal Difference learning 
( Sutton et al., 1998 ; Dayan, L. Abbott, et al., 2003 ). At the highest ’model-based’ level, action control involves an internal representation of state and action space, 
which can be flexibly used for learning, inference and control. This can be achieved via a broad array of algorithms, including Bayesian and Dynamic Programming 
approaches. In the figure, we also sketch how the two might fit together, with inferred pain signals being transferred from the predictive coding hierarchy to the RL 













































Third, animals can learn to actively escape from and avoid pain
hrough directly associating pain with specific preceding actions. This
ind of learning, termed instrumental learning, can involve a sophisti-
ated interplay between Pavlovian learning and reward learning pro-
esses, involving inhibition of actions that predict pain and selec-
ion of other responses that lead to relief, ideally before pain occurs
 Mowrer, 1960 ; Mackintosh, 1983 ). Although such escape and avoid-
nce actions can often be achieved purely by Pavlovian responses
 Bolles, 1972 ; Mackintosh, 1983 ), instrumental learning allows a much
reater diversity of action types to be learned, i.e. actions that wouldn’t
ormally be within the Pavlovian / innate repertoire. In the basic in-
trumental case, termed ’model-free’ learning, actions are emitted sim-
ly according to their learned value (i.e. on a scale from good to bad),
ut don’t evoke any representation of the actual outcome ( Dayan and
aw, 2008 ). In this way, such instrumental actions are sometimes called
timulus-response ’habits’ ( Dickinson and Balleine, 2002 ). 
Fourth, it is also clear that learning and action selection, especially
n humans, can be enormously sophisticated, involving a consciously
ccessible representation of exactly how events or actions lead specif-
cally to pain and other outcomes. This sort of internal ’model-based’
earning reflects what is normally considered to be cognitive or delib-
rative action selection, and allows great flexibility for mental plan-
ing, counter-factual thinking, episodic learning, contingency knowl-dge, and observational and instructed learning ( Atlas, Doll, et al.,
016 ; Koban et al., 2019 ). Because of its potential complexity, cognitive
ecision-making is the least understood, but clearly works alongside the
ther action systems: usually in concert, but occasionally in conflict with
hem ( Carter et al., 2006 ; Dayan, Niv, et al., 2006 ). 
.1. Reinforcement learning 
Given the complexity of the environment, most actions need to be
earned or inferred from experience. In this context, pain acts as a teach-
ng signal to optimise future behaviour in terms of harm limitation. But
his is a difficult problem, because optimising action incorporates the
act that actions should be employed as early as they can reliably avoid
r minimise pain. And since most interactions with the world involve
omplex sequences of individual actions, the brain needs to determine
hich actions in any sequence are the key actions that lead to avoid-
nce, and which are inconsequential. This is called the ’credit assign-
ent problem’ and falls within a domain of control theory called Rein-
orcement Learning (RL) ( Bellman, 2013 ). RL captures the nature of the
earning and action selection through trial-and-error interaction with
he environment, and has led to a number of algorithmic solutions of
arying complexity and potential biological plausibility ( Sutton et al.,
998 ). 
































































































































A particular class of algorithm, called Temporal Difference learn-
ng (TD) and its variants, has attracted substantial attention in neu-
oscience, because it offers an intuitive account of many well-studied
earning phenomena in Pavlovian and instrumental learning (for both
ewards and punishments)( Sutton et al., 1981 ). It involves learning a
alue term for any cue or action, computing a value prediction error as
ne moves through time (the difference between what happened and
hat was expected), and using the prediction error to update preceding
alues if their effective predictions are refuted by subsequent experience
o a greater or lesser extent. Critically, it has been shown that phasic
opaminergic activity in the ventral tegmental area and substantia ni-
ra encode reward prediction error signals ( Schultz et al., 1997 ); this
nding led to the notion that these models directly implement RL algo-
ithms, offering a mechanistic explanation of behaviour ( Schultz, 2016 ).
In the case of pain, there is reasonable evidence that the brain im-
lements TD-like algorithms for basic Pavlovian value learning of phasic
ain, as well as relief of tonic pain. In particular, ventral putamen re-
ponses correlate with a higher order pain prediction error, illustrating
ow prediction errors can be passed in chains of predictive cues be-
ore pain occurs (implying that they are not just tied to pain outcomes)
 Seymour et al., 2004 , 2005 ). Instrumental avoidance is more complex
ecause it necessarily involves the interaction between state and ac-
ion learning processes. Integrated TD-like models (such as the actor-
ritic model) provide a good account at a theoretical level ( Maia, 2010 ;
outoussis, Bentall, et al., 2008 ); within these models, a basic TD learn-
ng process concurs with the instrumental value learning component of
oth avoidance and escape learning ( Seymour et al., 2012 ; Roy et al.,
014 ). 
Some Pavlovian phenomena, such as latent inhibition, are difficult
o explain by simple RL algorithms, and almost certainly require an in-
ernal, generative model of the environment ( Gershman and Niv, 2012 ).
his is also the case for much of the more deliberative and cognitive as-
ects of pain avoidance ( Tolman, 1948 ; Gillan et al., 2016 ). It is often
ifficult to determine exactly how the brain learns and maintains com-
lex internal models, but Bayesian models - in which one optimally in-
ers state and action transition probabilities from experience - typically
rovide an intuitive approach to understand behaviour at a descriptive
evel, at the very least. Conceptually, an internal model allows the brain
o predict and evaluate sequences of actions and events. In this sense,
ction planning inverts this sequence given a desired outcome, to try
o determine what action is necessary now to optimise the chances of a
iven state, such as successful avoidance of pain ( Botvinick and Tous-
aint, 2012 ). 
It remains the case, however, that on the surface Bayesian RL algo-
ithms often don’t appear to capture choice behaviour in simple escape
nd avoidance experiments, illustrating that it can be very hard to know
xactly what the brain is optimising, and that one needs to be cautious
hen looking at a proposed circuit in isolation given that there are mul-
iple mechanisms that the brain can utilise to control behaviour. This
eads to the notion that emitted behaviour derives from the interplay
etween a complex hierarchy of learning processes ( Daw et al., 2005 ;
ee et al., 2014 ). Behavioural evidence supports this integration process
n the case of pain ( Wang et al., 2018 ). 
More broadly, the hierarchy of controllers that spans simple innate
esponses to complex cognitive decision-making illustrates the trade-
ff between speed and computational simplicity - which is critical for
alancing rapid defensive responding, accuracy and computational so-
histication ( O’Doherty et al., 2015 ). It seems likely that the structure
f pain motivational systems reflects the evolutionary addition of suc-
essively more sophisticated components. 
.2. Information-seeking 
The dynamics of avoidance also raise a further issue that gets to a
undamental problem in learning and motivation. If an action leads to
uccessful avoidance (i.e. no externally discernible outcome), then howong should the action be maintained over time? If avoidance is main-
ained indefinitely, then one will never know if the action is forever nec-
ssary, or if the avoided outcome has otherwise subsided ( Denrell et al.,
001 ). This problem illustrates a general problem in RL, called the
xploration-exploitation dilemma, and illustrates why many RL algo-
ithms are designed to consider two types of value: that related to the
utcome itself, and that related to information. Outcome-driven actions
re exploitative, because they relate to the best course of action given
hat is currently known ( Sutton et al., 1998 ). However, information-
riven actions are exploratory, because they are directed at finding out
f there are better actions whose current outcome value is partially or
ully unknown ( Thrun, 1992 ; Dayan and Sejnowski, 1996 ; Kakade et al.,
002 ). Exploration is best studied in the context of rewards, revealing
hree basic schema employed by the brain that relate to different con-
rollers ( Gershman, 2018 ): (1) a simple, novelty-seeking heuristic that
rives actions based on perceptual novelty ( Wittmann et al., 2008 );
2) ’undirected’ exploration, that effectively adds a level of noise to
hoices, sometimes driving choice away from the currently highest val-
ed ( Daw and O’Doherty, 2006 ); and (3) ’directed’ exploration that mo-
ivates action based on the calculated information content (related to
ncertainty) of an outcome ( Wilson et al., 2014 ). 
Exploration is not well studied in the case of pain-motivated
ction, although there is evidence of basic noisy exploration dur-
ng learning, representing a type of ’model-free’ information-seeking
 Seymour, Daw, et al., 2012 ; Zhang et al., 2018 ). Importantly, how-
ver, uncertainty during learning appears to increase perceived pain
 Yoshida et al., 2013 ; Taylor et al., 2017 ; Zhang et al., 2018 ). This im-
lies that exploration may shape the experience of pain itself, over and
bove driving exploratory actions. Although an explicit link between
ncertainty-based modulation of pain perception and exploration has
et to be shown, this finding provides support to the idea that experi-
nced pain is modulated by not just the direct outcome value associ-
ted with the stimulus, but also its informational value. Furthermore,
he effect of uncertainty on pain may also be modulated by controlla-
ility, suggesting that informational value may be enhanced when it
s exploitable ( Zhang et al., 2018 ). This leads to an control system in
hich pain experience is associated to a flexible, adaptive value tuned
y the long-run utility of its information for survival, rather than a fixed
utcome value estimate of potential harm ( Seymour, 2019 ). 
. How do sensory and motivational processes interact? 
According to the theoretical propositions above, perceptual infer-
nce and action control represent distinct computational processes, both
tilising computational architectures that are at least partially hierar-
hically organised. This leads to the question of how they interact. In-
uitively, the system encoding perceptual inferences about pain could
ransfer its output to an action control system, and vice versa, at com-
arable levels of their respective hierarchies: in simple words, this would
llow the brain to decide ’what is this?’, ’how harmful is it?’ and ’what
hall I do about it?’, at varying levels of computational speed and so-
histication. 
There is some evidence for this idea. At the lowest level, when no-
iceptive signals enter the dorsal horn, there are clearly segmental cir-
uits that mediate basic motor reflexive responses, which are emitted
efore the brain processes nociceptive information ( Todd, 2010 ). At the
ighest level, perceptual awareness of a pain state should relate to a
ognitive, model-based system that yields reportable (’stated’) prefer-
nces about proposed action. This must be the case even if consciously
xperienced pain is not always acted upon - a situation that can exist
ecause ’lower’ controllers (i.e. model-free habits, Pavlovian and innate
esponses) can still exert a dominant effect on overall behaviour (which
auses the well known distinction between wanting and liking in the
ase of rewards ( Berridge, 2009 ), or unwanting and disliking in the case
f punishment/pain ( Seymour and Dolan, 2013 )). 



































































Fig. 3. Simplified model of functional anatomy of pain system. The figure 
shows major brain regions underlying pain perceptual and action control. The 
red regions show major pathways involved in exteroceptive and interoceptive 
perceptual inference, arising from deep and superficial layers of dorsal horn. 
Distinct ascending pathways also project to the PAG and PBN, which connect 
widely to brain regions involved in motivational processing (light blue), includ- 
ing amygdala, striatal and basal ganglia nuclei, which access more sophisti- 
cated representations of value in lateral orbital (state-based) and ventromedial 
(action-based) prefrontal cortices. One possible role of these circuits is to pro- 
vide input that allows the ACC to compute informational value, which tunes 
the overall perception of pain according to its ultimate function as a control 
signal for optimal action. Other candidates for integrating perceptual and moti- 
vational information are shown in purple, whereas area known to be important 
for the control of pain behaviour are shown in yellow. Higher level represen- 
tations of pain may be stored in hippocampal-prefrontal networks (navy), al- 
low conscious episodic memory, conceptual and configural understanding of 
pain, planning, and communication. aINS: anterior insula; ACC: anterior cingu- 
late cortex; aMCC: anterior middle cingulate cortex; Amy: amygdala; BNST: bed 
nucleus of the stria terminalis; Cb: cerebellum; dlPFC: dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex; DS: dorsal striatum; Hi: hippocampus; HN: habenula; Hypo: hypothala- 
mus; lOFC: lateral orbitofrontal cortex; NAc: nucleus accumbens; PAG: periac- 
queductal grey; PBN: parabrachial nuclei; pINS: posterior insula; PPC: posterior 
parietal cortex; RVM: rostral ventromedial medulla; S1: primary somatosensory 
cortex; S2: secondary somatosensory cortex; Th: thalamus; vlPFC: ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex; vmPFC: ventromedial prefrontal cortex; VTA: ventral tegmen- 
tal area. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the 




















d  Interactions between inference and control processes at intermediate
evels of respective processing hierarchies are harder to discern. How-
ver, there are a number of plausible candidate mechanisms. Firstly,
t is reasonable to propose that PAG-basal ganglia-amygdala-thalamic
ircuits might subserve a subcortical network in which semi-processed
ociceptive information can feed into model-free Pavlovian and instru-
ental control systems. The core input site into model free motivational
ircuits is via the PAG and parabrachial nuclei (PBN) in the brainstem;
oth receive direct projections from a population of superficial dorsal
orn cells, distinct from projections to the medial thalamic nuclei (in-
luding VMPo) ( Gauriau et al., 2002 ; Craig, 2003 ; Roeder et al., 2016 ).
AG and PBN also receive strong projections from the insula cortex
 Evrard, 2019 ). Furthermore, the primate amygdala projects to the in-
ula, S2 and S1 ( Amaral et al., 1984 ). This is crucial, because it provides
he opportunity for crosstalk between the perceptual inference and con-
rol streams. Thus, from an anatomical perspective, the motivational
ircuits for model-free Pavlovian and instrumental learning receive in-
ut both from afferent pathways that are distinct to that involved in
erceptual inference, and also from cortical regions that are likely to
ompute interoceptive and exteroceptive inference. 
Other candidates for integration between sensory and motivational
ain processing pathways are the anterior insula, putamen, anterior cin-
ulate cortex (ACC), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), posterior
arietal cortex and cerebellum ( Fig 3 ). The anterior insula is highly
onnected to the posterior insula (which in turns receive projections
rom sensory pain processing streams, i.e. S1, S2, and parietal cor-
ex), and many regions that form part of broader motivational net-
orks ( Cauda et al., 2011 ); this places the anterior insula in the ideal
etting to integrate preprocessed nociceptive information with motiva-
ional information (encoded in value-based learning systems); indeed a
ecent human, neuroimaging study provides support for this hypothesis
 Geuter, 2017 ). 
In the basal ganglia, neural populations in the primate puta-
en receive somatotopically-organised projections from S1 and S2
 Flaherty et al., 1991 , 1995 ; Robbe, 2018 ). There is also evidence
hat the ventral putamen encodes prediction errors in a range of both
ppetitive and aversive learning tasks ( Seymour et al., 2004 , 2005 ;
elgado et al., 2008 ); this does not necessarily imply an interaction
ith the sensorimotor neural populations of the putamen, but it makes
t highly likely. 
Another key integrative region is the ACC, a well-known central hub
n pain processingreceiving projections from both the insula and the
osterior parietal cortex. The ACC is activated during tasks that require
o discriminate the intensity and spatial location of nociceptive stimuli
 Oshiro et al., 2009 ). Distinct regions of the ACC are also core nodes
n motivational circuits, potentially allowing the ACC to compute the
nformational value of pain states, and so tune the overall perception of
ain according to its ultimate function as a control signal for optimal
ction ( Seymour, 2019 ). 
A region highly connected to the ACC, the dlPFC, is also a candidate
or sensory-motivational integration, being engaged in pain discrimina-
ion tasks ( Bornhövd et al., 2002 ; Oshiro et al., 2009 ; Lobanov, 2013 ),
ndogenous pain suppression ( Lorenz et al., 2003 ; Wager, Rilling, et al.,
004 ), encoding value-based representations and top-down action selec-
ion ( Botvinick and Braver, 2015 ; Kouneiher et al., 2009 ). Interestingly,
here is increasing evidence of dlPFC changes in some chronic pain disor-
ers, which reverse following pain resolution ( Seminowicz et al., 2017 ).
Prefrontal regions, including the dlPFC, are densely connected to the
osterior parietal cortex. Amongst other things, the posterior parietal
ortex is involved in attention and orientation to the sensory features
f nociceptive stimuli ( Oshiro et al., 2009 ; Lobanov, 2013 ). Neurons in
he primate ventral intraparietal cortex can elicit nocifensive responses
 Kaas et al., 2016 ), suggesting that this region is important for integrat-
ng nociceptive and motor information for bodily defence. In humans,
ntraparietal regions appear to also encode RL signals ( O’Doherty et al.,
015 ); in particular, neural activity in the intraparietal cortex correlatesith state-prediction errors, which are used to underpin the learning of
tate transition probabilities in model-based RL ( Gläscher et al., 2010 ).
his raises the interesting possibility that state-prediction errors might
e used as a common currency between pain inference and action con-
rol. 
Finally, the cerebellum is a likely candidate for integrating per-
eptual and motivational information. Primary afferents transmit no-
iceptive signals to the cerebellum via the pontine nuclei and the in-
erior olive ( Snyder et al., 1978 ); in humans, acute and pathological
ain activates vermal lobules IV/V and bilateral hemispheric lobule VI
 Moulton et al., 2010 ). These cerebellar regions also receive descend-
ng afferent input from several regions involved in sensory and moti-
ational processing (S1, superior parietal lobule and PAG via the infe-
ior olive; amygdala, dlPFC, intraparietal cortex via the pontine nuclei);
he cerebellum sends ascending output to the thalamus and hypothala-
us ( Moulton et al., 2010 ), which is involved in the regulation of pain
ehaviour. Although it is not clear how the cerebellum encodes noci-
eptive information, it seems to have a modulatory effect on pain detec-
ion ( Siegel et al., 1974 ) and nocifensive motor behaviour, such as with-
rawal and freezing in rodents ( Cerminara et al., 2009 ; Dimitrova et al.,


































































































































003 ). There is also evidence of cerebellar involvement during the antic-
pation of painful stimuli ( Ploghaus et al., 1999 ). The cerebellar hemi-
pheric lobules I, IV-VI and the tonsils are also involved in Pavlovian
ain conditioning ( Lange et al., 2015 ; Zhang et al., 2016 ; Frontera et al.,
020 ; Ernst et al., 2019 ). Altogether, this evidence suggests the cerebel-
um might perform (some kind of) predictions about pain that can be
elayed to sensory, motivational and motor control pathways. 
From a computational perspective, a more subtle issue then relates
o exactly what quantities might be shared between perceptual and
ction/motivational systems. For instance, what information is neces-
ary or sufficient for effective communication to be shared between
erceptual and motivational processing streams? Clearly both predic-
ive coding and reinforcement learning algorithms use prediction er-
ors, which raises the question as to whether they encode prediction
rrors in the same way. On the surface, this seems plausible: for in-
tance in a conditioning paradigm whereby a cue predicts pain, the
rediction error guides both perception and response acquisition. How-
ver, when one looks beyond simple paradigms, the equivalence be-
ween a sensory prediction error and a value prediction error becomes
roblematic. 
First, a key aspect of RL is the fact that prediction errors occur at
ny point antecedent of pain in a sequence or predictors, rather than
nly at the time of the pain itself. That is, RL predictions for pain will
ccur when different cues disagree about the prediction of pain, a long
ime before the pain itself occurs. Indeed this distinguishes early models
f Pavlovian conditioning, such as the Rescorla-Wagner model, with RL
odels, since the former cannot accommodate higher-order condition-
ng phenomena ( Sutton et al., 1981 ; Seymour et al., 2004 ). In principle,
owever, perceptual inference can also be predictive, but this aspect of
erceptual inference has not been thoroughly investigated in the case of
ain. 
Second, a core feature of model-free value learning is that it gen-
ralises across punishments of different types. This is manifest in a
aradigm termed ’transreinforcer blocking’, in which a cue fails to ac-
uire a response to one type of punishment (e.g. pain) in the pres-
nce of a cue that already predicts a different type of punishment
e.g. aversive noise). Since a perceptual prediction error to noise and
ain would be entirely distinct, blocking must necessarily involve a
ommon, shared aversive signal distinct from perceptual predictions
 Dickinson and Dearing, 1979 ). 
Third, pain can be conditioned to be to appetitive values. In counter-
onditioning, pain acts as a cue for reward, rather than as the outcome
n a Pavlovian paradigm, and in this context pain acquires appetitive
onditioned responses ( Eroféeva, 1921 ). This means that the onset of a
ainful stimulus induces a positive reward-like value prediction error,
ut a pain-like sensory prediction error, again indicating how perceptual
nference and action control must necessarily be dissociable. 
Despite these necessary differences in intermediate-level sensory and
otivational processing, at the higher level there is clearly a strong reso-
ance between the two systems. This is because both draw on a common
nternal cognitive representation of the nociceptive event. Just how this
nternal representation of pain is generated and encoded in the brain
s not known, and indeed what this representation actually represents
n terms of the exteroceptive or interoceptive aspects of the stimulus
emains unclear. However, it seems likely that conscious, cognitive ap-
reciation of a painful stimulus incorporates both the sensory and moti-
ational features in a much more integrated manner than lower levels.
his reflects a broader issue of how the brain generates perception, mo-
ivation and action, addressed by Bayesian, active inference accounts.
or instance, the Free Energy Framework proposes that sensation, mo-
ivation and action are intrinsically related by their drive to understand
he causes of unexpected stimuli and minimise surprise ( Friston, 2010 ;
ezzulo et al., 2015 ; Parr et al., 2018 ); these accounts have been ap-
lied to pain only rarely ( Fardo et al., 2017 ; Geuter, 2017 ; Tabor &
urr, 2019 ) and more research in this field is needed. .1. How does the brain give rise to pain experience? 
In terms of its phenomenal content, it is possible to suggest three
ore components of pain that can be at least partially related to spe-
ific computational and anatomical substrates. First, pain experience
annot be devolved from its sensory features, such as quality, intensity
nd spatial location, and this seems to arise from a primarily extero-
eptive sensory inferential pathway involving a somatosensory cortex-
entred networks (including with parietal, posterior insula and inferior
rontal cortices) ( Oshiro et al., 2009 ; Mancini et al., 2016 ; Fardo et al.,
017 ). Second, pain is also an interocetive sensory percept - an ’em-
odied homoeostatic sense’ with an inextricable link to defensive action
 Craig, 2003 ), and this maps well to both an insula cortical hierarchy
nd value-based learning and control circuits ( Seth, 2013 ; Büchel et al.,
014 ; Allen et al., 2018 ). Third, pain is finely tuned according to its long-
erm value as a learning and control signal, incorporating the exploitable
nformation that it conveys: this may be computed across a network of
egions centred on the anterior cingulate cortex involved in uncertainty
nd controllability computations ( Seymour, 2019 ). Importantly, these
ierarchical inference and control operations are likely to be integrated
cross multisensory channels, including interoceptive and exteroceptive
ociceptive pathways, alongside other non-nociceptive sensory and ac-
ion inference pathways ( Friston, 2013 ). Ultimately these underlying
ircuits are coordinated over a large anatomical area to yield not only
ffective behaviour, but also the unified and unique subjective qualia of
ain. 
One can also consider the ’access’ component of pain consciousness
 Block, 2005 ), i.e. the ability to cognitively evoke the concept of pain
nd use it for ’thinking’ and planning. Clearly, the brain builds a con-
eptual model of pain which allows conscious knowledge and imagi-
ation, explicit memory, planning, and verbal communication. This in-
ernal conscious representation and understanding is distinct from the
henomenal feeling of pain (e.g. thinking about pain is not phenomeno-
ogically painful), but allows intelligent defensive behaviour. Although
ittle studied, it seems likely to draw on hippocampal-centred networks
ncorporating prefrontal cortical regions such as the middle and inferior
rontal gyri ( Carter et al., 2006 ). 
Overall, this perspective on the subjective feeling of pain fits with
ecoding studies showing that pain perception derives from informa-
ion contained with disparate brain networks ( Wager, Atlas, et al., 2013 ;
oo et al., 2015 ). The key to understanding pain, therefore, is under-
tanding precisely what information processing operations are being
mplemented in these specific underlying circuits. Ultimately, this is a
ecessary step in understanding how brain activity gives rise to pain
xperience, whether abnormalities in brain computations contribute to
hronic pain, and how to identify targets for new pain therapies. 
In summary, the empirical evidence suggests there are multiple par-
llel hierarchical circuits that implement distinct components of infor-
ation processing - and ultimately yield effective and efficient pain be-
aviour. This tells us something fundamental about pain: the fact that
here are multiple and parallel pathways suggests, from the perspective
f a generative or forward model, being in a state of pain has multiple
ensory consequences in many domains. These can include nociceptive
nd interoceptive signals, while at the same time, making predictions in
he somatosensory and proprioceptive domain. Furthermore, it tells us
hat pain - as a construct - must be deep in the hierarchy. In turn, this
uggests that pain is quintessentially constructive in nature. On the ac-
ive inference view, pain can be thought of as a hypothesis entertained
y the brain that provides the simplest explanation for the pattern of
nputs that the individualis currently experiencing. In virtue of the fact
hat it is a high-level construct that necessarily entails descending pre-
ictions of precision, there is also an argument that it loses phenome-
al transparency ( Limanowski and Friston, 2018 ). In other words, ‘not
nly do I have qualitative experience of pain, but I know that I am in
ain’. 
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